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CUTTING THE "RESIDENTIAL APRONSTRINGS"
OF VOTING MINORS
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a
free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise
the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of
other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of
the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously
scrutinized.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The possibility of an infusion of youthful inspiration into our
democratic system became a legal reality on June 30, 1971, when the
traditional voting age was lowered to eighteen. Congress had previ-
ously lowered the voting age for both state and national elections
through the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970.1 However,
the United States Supreme Court in Oregon v. Mitchell,2 upheld the
lowering of the voting age in presidential and congressional elec-
tions but ruled the change unconstitutional as it applied to state
and local elections.3
* Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-562 (1964).
1. Besides lowering the voting age, the amendments renewed portions
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973p (Supp.
IV, 1969).
2. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
3. The eighteen year old provision, as it applied to state and local elec-
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In an effort to enfranchise eighteen to twenty year olds for all
elections, the twenty-sixth amendment was passed. As a result,
the franchise was extended to eleven million young people.4 The
decision by the California Supreme Court in Jolicoeur v. Mihalyu
promotes the fullest possible extension of the franchise pursuant to
the twenty-sixth amendment. Justice Peters, speaking for the ma-
jority of the court, followed constitutional precedent when he ruled
against discrimination on account of minority which impinged the
fundamental right to vote.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Nine minors were denied registration when they sought to regis-
ter in the jurisdiction they claimed as their actual, permanent resi-
dence rather than at their parents' residence. For one of the nine
petitioners, this meant that he would have to marry before he could
vote, for his parents lived in Argentina. Two others would have
had to travel to Hawaii and Arizona. The remaining individuals
had to register in other California jurisdictions, the furthest being
seven-hundred miles away. One of these petitioners had never even
resided at his parents' current residence.
The refusal to register these minors was pursuant to a California
Attorney General's opinion of February 17, 1971,0 which said that
an unmarried minor's residence for election purposes is his parents'
home.
7
tions, was held unconstitutional because under article 1, § 2, of the
United States Constitution, the states have the power to set qualifications
in these elections. Furthermore, the Constitution reserves that power to
the states, unless it is limited by a specific constitutional amendment.
Since no amendment authorized Congress to lower the voting age in state
and local elections, the provision was held unconstitutional. The other
provisions of the act, however, were upheld. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112 (1970).
4. "Of the newly enfranchised 18 to 20 year olds, the Census Bureau
said 900,000 are in high school, 4 million in college, 4.1 million working full
time, 1 million housewives, 800,000 in the armed services, and the rest In
hospitals, prisons or other institutions. CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REPORT, V. XXIX,
no. 27 at 1437. For a discussion of the language of the twenty-sixth
amendment and its impact, see text accompanying notes 12-20, infra.
5. 5 Cal. 3d 565, 488 P. 2d 1, 96 Cal. Rptr. 997 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Jolicoeur].
6. 54 Anv. Ops. CAL. A=rY. GEN. 7, Op. No. 70-312 Feb. 17, 1971.
7. 54 ADV. Ops. CAL. ATTY. GN. at 12. The decision was pursuant to
CAL. GovT. CODE § 244 (West 1966):
Determination of place of residence. In determining the place of
residence the following rules are tobe observed..
(d) The residence of the father during his life, and after his death
the residence of the mother, while she remans unmarried is the
residence of the unmarried minor child, provided that when the
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The California Supreme Court, taking the case on original juris-
diction,8 unanimously held: to treat minors differently from adults
for any purpose related to voting violates the twenty-sixth amend-
ment.9 The opinion of the court concluded that, after the passage of
the twenty-sixth amendment, California law required a minor's
emancipation for voting purposes. The court reasoned that Gov-
ernment Code, section 244,10 was not to be absolutely interpreted
since California law permits a minor's emancipation for residential
and other purposes and because state policy demands that a minor
vote where he resides. Three concurring justices,1 dispensing with
any consideration of California law, stated that the twenty-sixth
amendment alone compel [s] the court's decision once an abridge-
ment solely on account of age has been established. Jolicoeur v.
Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 488 P2d 1, 96 Cal. Rptr. 967 (1971.)
This article will first seek to examine the similarity of the
language between the twenty-sixth amendment and previous
amendments which also prevent the abridgment of the franchise.
Next, it will be shown that state statutes, which are contrary to the
twenty-sixth amendment and the legislative intent in enacting the
amendment, must be invalidated, as was the case in Jolicoeur, to
ensure the free exercise of the franchise. Furthermore, this article
parents are separated, the residence of the parent with whom an
unmarried minor child maintains his place of abode is the residence
of such unmarried minor child.
(f) The residence of an unmarried minor who has a parent living
cannot be changes by his own act.
8. Petitioners invoked the court's original jurisdiction. CAL. CONST.
art. VI, § 10; vice, CAL. RuLEs OF CouRT, rule 56(a) (West 1964).
In this case the last day to register for the November 2, 1971, election
was September 9, 1971. The last day to register for the June 6, 1972, elec-
tion was April 13, 1972. The court noted that it was highly unlikely that
petitioners could secure a superior court decision and complete appeals
before these deadlines. Jolicoeur, 5 Cal. 3d at 570, 488 P.2d at 3, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 699.
9. This article will occasionally refer to students and the residential
restrictions confronting them. This is done solely for the sake of compari-
son, since their situation is often analogous to that of minors. No attempt
is made to fully discuss the differential treatment of students. For a good
discussion of the differential treatment of students caused by state resi-
dence requirements imposed upon them, see: Singer, Student Power at
the Polls, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 703 (1970).
10. See note 7 supra.
11. C.J. Wright wrote the concurring opinion joined by J. McComb and
J. Burke.
will seek to show that other constitutional grounds, unconsidered
by the court in Jolicoeur, serve equally well to invalidate these
statutes.
III. Snvi AiTy or LANGUAGE
The twenty-sixth amendment provides:
The right of citizens of the United States eighteen years of age or
older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of age.12
Similar language is to be found in the fifteenth,18 nineteenth,14 and
twenty-fourth 5 amendments to the Constitution which eliminate
race, sex, and wealth, respectively, as legitimate qualifications on
the right to vote. That the exact phrase, "shall not be denied or
abridged", was reiterated with each amendment is significant. It
suggests that with each, the objective was the same, to prohibit the
abridgment of the right to vote. Referring to this phrase in the
twenty-fourth amendment, the court in Gray v. Johnson6 defined
the word "abridge" to mean to circumscribe or burden when used
in connection with or following the word "deny". This definition
should apply to the fifteenth, nineteenth, and twenty-sixth amend-
ments which similarly seek the unburdened exercise of the fran-
chise.
In Gray, a Mississippi statute imposed separate procedures on vot-
ers exempted by state law from payment of a poll tax and those
exempted by a federal constitutional provision. Those in the latter
group had the added burden of obtaining a poll tax receipt prior to
voting. The court reached the conclusion that the statute was un-
constitutional as a violation of the twenty-fourth amendment:
It was the clear intention and purpose of the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution that neither the United
States, nor any state should impair the vested right of a duly regis-
tered voter to vote by reason of his failure to pay a poll tax. No
state is thus permitted to circumscribe or burden or impair or im-
pede the right of a voter to the free and effective exercise and
12. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXVI, § 1.
13. The right of citizens of the United States shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color
or previous condition of servitude. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, § 1 (emphasis
added).
14. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIX (emphasis added).
15. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or
other election for President or Vice-President, for electors for Presidential
or Vice-Presidential, or for Senator or Representative in Congress shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States by reason or failure to pay
any poll tax or other tax. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
16. 234 F. Supp. 743, 746 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
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enjoyment of his franchise in any election for a Federal official "by
reason of failure to pay any poll tax" as the amendment expressly
provides.17
In Lane v. Wilson,' 8 an Oklahoma statute would forever disen-
franchise blacks if they did not register within a twelve day period;
however, whites, who were previously on registration lists, were
entitled to vote. This was held to be contrary to the fifteenth
amendment which ". . . secures freedom from discrimination on ac-
count of race in matters affecting the franchise."'19
The court in Jolicoeur aligned itself with these decisions when it
struck down the requirement that a minor, age eighteen to twenty,
has a residence appended to that of his parents' for voting purposes.
The restriction in Jolicoeur, like that found in Gray and Lane, cre-
ated two procedures. Adults could register and vote where they
resided, but minors had to register and vote at their parents' abode.
In Gray, a distinction was made between those exempted by state
law from payment of a poll tax and those exempted by the federal
constitution. The distinction forced those in the latter group to
show a poll tax receipt prior to voting. The separate procedures
in Lane presumed whites to be on registration lists while blacks had
to register within a fixed time period. In each case one procedure
was clearly more burdensome than the other. The minors in Joli-
coeur had the more burdensome procedure because they were
forced to travel to their parents' home or vote absentee.
The basis of each decision was the inequality of treatment result-
ing from two procedures, rather than the absolute denial of the
right to vote. Even though a different type of abridgment was
used in each case to achieve the unequal treatment, each met a simi-
lar fate. The court in all three cases invoked an amendment, de-
signed to be a limitation upon the state, and eliminated the discrimi-
nation.
The degree of discrimination needed for each of the amendments
to operate was irrelevant:
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment, like the Twenty-Fourth, Nine-
teenth, and Fifteenth before it, "nullifies sophisticated as well as
simple-minded discrimination. It hits onerous procedural require-
17. 234 F. Supp. at 746.
18. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
19. 307 U.S. at 274.
ments which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise... al-
though the abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted.
"20
As blacks were relieved of procedural burdens by the fifteenth and
twenty-fourth amendments in Lane and Gray, respectively, the
twenty-sixth amendment was similarly invoked in Jolicoeur to re-
lieve voting minors of their procedural burdens.
IV. STATE PROVISIONS-POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENTS
A Texas statute21 demonstrates the potential states have for bur-
dening the right to vote for all practical purposes while abstractly
leaving it intact. The statute uses age as one of the criteria to de-
termine a student's ability to establish a residence within the state.
Students over twenty-one, who satisfy the other criteria, may be
classified as "resident students". But a student, who also happens
to be a minor, has a residence attached to that of his family. Thus,
if his family does not reside in the state, there is no way he can
gain residence there. It is of minimal consolation to minor stu-
dents that their legal right to vote remains intact:
Compelling young people who live apart from their parents to
travel to their parents' district to register and vote or else to reg-
ister and vote as absentees burdens their right to vote no less
than the State of Mississippi burdened its poor people in Gray.
Such young people would be isolated from local political activity,
with a concomitant reduction in their political influence and infor-
mation. 22
Minors, who are not students, are confronted with similar stat-
utes. In Delaware, a person must be twenty-one before he can
20. 5 Cal. 3d at 571, 488 P.2d at 4, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
21. TEX. Civ. STAT. art. 2654c § 1 (e) (Vernon 1965):
(1) A nonresident student is hereby defined to be a student of
less than twenty-one (21) years of age, living away from his fam-
ily and whose family resides in another state, or whose family has
not resided in Texas for the twelve (12) months immediately pre-
ceeding the date of registration; or a student of twenty-one (21)
years of age or over who resides out of the state or who has not
been a resident of the state twelve (12) months immediately pre-
ceding the date of registration.
(2) Individuals twenty-one (21) years of age or over who have
come from without the state and who are gainfully employed
within the state for a period of twelve (12) months prior to regis-
tering in an educational institution shall be classified as "resident
students" as long as they continue to maintain such legal residence
in the state.
This statute defines resident and non-resident students for purposes of
imposing tuition in state colleges and universities. However, because a
student is labeled a non-resident by this statute, he may also be labeled a
non-resident for voting purposes.
22. 5 Cal. 3d at 571, 488 P.2d at 4, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
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acquire a legal domicile within the state.23 Until a minor has at-
tained that age, his domicile remains and follows that of his father.
Similar statutes in Georgia, where eighteen year olds have been al-
lowed to vote since 1943,24 fix the domicile of a minor to be that of
his father.2 The statutes allow any person sui juris to change his
domicile.26 Minors, however, because their domicile is dependent
on that of their father, are not sui juris.27 Therefore, they cannot
23. DEL.. CODE Aw. tit. 13, § 1701 (West 1953):
Adult: Any person of the age of 21 years, being a citizen of this or
any other State of the United States, and who has lived for two
successive years in this State, and for the purpose of determining
domicile in any county of the State, has lived for one year in such
county, and who has, during that time maintained himself and his
family shall be held to have acquired a legal domicile therein.
DEL. CODE A.N. tit. 13, § 1703 (West 1953):
Legitimate Children: Legitimate children follow and have the
domicile of their father, if he has any within the State, until they
gain a domicile of their own; but if he has none, they shall, in like
manner, follow and have the domicile of their mother, if she has
any.
24. GA. CONST. art. II, § 2-702 (Harrison 1948):
Paragraph II. Who shall be an elector entitled to register and
vote.-Every citizen of the United States, eighteen years old or up-
wards, not laboring under any of the disabilities named in this
Article, and possessing the qualifications provided by it, shall be
an elector and entitled to register and vote at any election by the
people: Provided, that no soldier, sailor or marine in the military
or naval services of the United States shall acquire the rights of an
elector by reason of being stationed on duty in this State.
The above paragraph was ratified August 3, 1943, as an amendment to
the Constitution of 1877.
25. GA. ANN. CODE, § 79-404 (Harrison 1964):
Minors.-The domicile of every minor shall be that of his father,
if alive, unless such father shall have voluntarily relinquished his
parental authority to some other person. In such event the domi-
cile of the minor shall be that of the person to whom parental au-
thority has been relinquished, or, his master, if an apprentice, or
his employer; if neither master nor employer, then the place of his
own choice; if the father shall be dead, then the domicile of the
minor shall be that of his guardian, if he has one in this State; if
no guardian, then of his mother, if alive; if no mother, then of his
employer; if no employer, then of his own choice. The domicile
of an illegitimate child shall be that of his mother.
26. GA. AnN. CODE, § 79-406 (Harrison 1964):
Change of domicile; intention.-The domicile of a person sui juris
may be changed by an actual change of residence with the avowed
intention of remaining. A declaration of an intention to change the
domicile is ineffectual for that purpose until some act is done in
execution of the intention.
27. GA. AN. CODE, § 79-407 (Harrison 1964):
Persons not sui juris.-A person whose domicile for any reason is
dependent upon that of another can, by no act of volition of his,
effect a change of his own domicile; nor can guardian change the
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effect a change of their domicile. These statutes are almost identi-
cal to the statute used to discriminate against minors in Jolicoeur.2 8
The consequences of such statutes may prove devastating.29 A
minor working full-time, as were two of the petitioners in Jolicoeur,
while being able to afford a residence of his own, would have to at-
tain the age of majority before he could vote at that residence. In
the meantime, he might be subject to property taxes on this resi-
dence and yet have no voice in the electoral process which would
determine how these funds were to be spent. Taxation without
representation is not a remote possibility if these statutes are used
to burden a minor's right to vote. Because of their potential for
damaging results, state statutes, burdening a minor's right to vote,
must necessarily be dealt with in accordance with the decision in
Jolicoeur.
The California court recognized that the right to vote gives rise
to a relation which is inconsistent with parental control. Adhering
to a common sense approach, the court initially recognized the "sub-
stantial likelihood" that a minor is emancipated for all purposes
when he lives apart from his parents.3 0 It then determined that
there was "at least" an emancipation for residential purposes31 be-
cause a minor may be emancipated for specific purposes under Cali-
fornia law.32 Finally, the court in Jolicoeur determined that a "mi-
domicile of his ward by a change of his own or otherwise, so as
to interfere with the rules of inheritance or succession, or other-
wise affect the rights of inheritance of third persons.
28. CAL. GOV'T CoDE; § 244; see note 7 supra.
29. It is difficult to assess the effect of such provisions on the voting of
minors in Georgia. It is interesting to note, however, that two-thirds of
the enfranchised youths, prior to the passage of the twenty-sixth amend-
ment, resided in this state. Yet Georgia had an embarrassing 42.9%
overall turnout in 1968, lower than any other state. "[Moreover], (on the
national scene) the percentage of youths not registering was more than
double the national rate." The reasons given for failure to register were
"... inability to register, failure to meet residency requirements, and in-
difference to the vote." Hearings on S.J. Res. 7, 19, 32, 34, 38, 73, 87, 102,
105, 141, 147 Relating to Proposed Constitutional Amendments Lowering the
Voting Age to 18, Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 64 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings].
30. 5 Cal. 3d at 581, 488 P.2d at 11, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
31. Id.
32. California has in fact recognized the emancipation of minors even
when a fundamental right is not involved. For example, a minor who en-
lists or is inducted into the armed services is considered emancipated.
Argonaut Ins. Exchange v. Kates, 137 Cal. App. 2d 158, 289 P.2d 801 (1955).
More recently, the California Supreme Court declared that emancipation
was not necessary for a minor to sue his father for negligence. Gibson v.
Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1970). Since emanci-
pation is unnecessary in this instance, a strong argument may be made for
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nor is necessarily emancipated for all purposes related to voting
when he is given the vote in his own right. . .. "33
The conclusion reached in Jolicoeur was the only solution which
would be consonant with the twenty-sixth amendment. Otherwise,
what the twenty-sixth amendment gave to minors with one hand,
the states would take away with the other. State statutes which
place special burdens on minors would discourage them in the exer-
cise of their newly acquired right. After the twenty-sixth amend-
ment, these statutes may even be unconstitutional on their face be-
cause of their undue interference with the right to vote.
V. RESIDENTIAL RESTRICTIONS ON MINORS CONTRARY TO
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The courts in both Gray and Lane rested their decisions soley
upon the particular amendment involved to invalidate voting
restrictions. The majority of the court in Jolicoeur, however, re-
lied upon congressional publications revealing the legislative justi-
fication for the twenty-sixth amendment. While adding support to
their decision, the majority at the same time indirectly admits that
additional support is necessary. The similarity of the twenty-sixth
amendment to other voting amendments would seem to suggest that
it too can stand alone.
Nevertheless, the testimony before the Senate subcommittee is
bulging with statements indicating the expressed theme that minors
of this age had attained the requisite maturity to be granted the
franchise. As stated by Theodore Sorensen, quoting from the Cox
Commission which studied the disorders at Columbia University:
The present generation of young people in our universities is the
best informed, the most intelligent, and the most idealistic this
country has even known * * * the most sensitive to public issues
* * * the most sophisticated in political tactics. * * * [with] a
higher level of social conscience than preceding generations. 34
All the newly enfranchised minors are not university students.
There is evidence, however, that high school students have also
more rapidly matured.3 5
unfastening the apronstrings of minors for all purposes, and certainly for
voting purposes.
33. 5 Cal. 3d at 579, 488 P.2d at 10, 96 Cal. Rptr. 706.
34. 1970 Hearings, supra note 29, at 16.
35. 1970 Hearings, supra note 29, at 295:
While Congress was aware of the maturity of youth today, it was
also aware of their idealism and the need to funnel it into the
system:
What better way is there to curb even the more militant young
people than to channel their spirits in a constructive direction by
allowing them to vote? I believe it is essential that we allow an
expression of feelings within the established political framework.
If we do not, I fear that even greater numbers of America's young
people will become frustrated, disillusioned and alienated from our
society.3 6
The intent of the legislature was to give these young people the
right to vote, " [n] ot as a gesture but as a right .... 1)"7 In giving
full impact to this legislative intention, Jolicoeur recognized the
necessary existence of a corresponding right to establish a domi-
cile of choice for voting purposes. The majority of the court be-
lieved that the California statute, which worked to circumscribe the
participation of minors in the electoral process, was not only con-
trary to the twenty-sixth amendment, but inconsistent with the
legislative intent in enacting the amendment.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Dispensing with any consideration of legislative intent, the con-
curring justices would likewise invalidate statutes restricting the
franchise. They read the twenty-sixth amendment as a mandate
which compels the result in Jolicoeur once an abridgment solely
on account of age is established.38 The argument of the concurring
justices is uncomplicated and forceful adherence to the supreme law
of the land. Whenever there exists a prohibition embodied within
the federal Constitution, it alone is decisive. Delving into a consid-
eration of lesser sources, such as legislative intent, which yield the
same result, is valueless. 39
Today, all authorities agree that high school graduates are better
educated than ever before in the history of our country. Scores
on tests indicate that the eighteen year olds of today are more
concerned and more aware of national and local issues than their
elders. On the subjects of government, politics, and the functions
of the electoral system time and time again young adults score
higher than their parents. The young men and women reaching
maturity in the past decade have also shown a greater desire to
participate in the political processes of the nation than ever
before (statement of U.S. Senator Joseph Montoya).
36. 1970 Hearings, supra note 29, at 295.
37. Hearings on S.J. Res. 8, 14, 78, Relating to Lowering the Voting Age
to 18, Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 36 (1968) (statement
of U.S. Senator William Proxmire).
38. 5 Cal. 3d at 583, 488 P.2d at 12, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
39. Id.
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Other than the twenty-sixth amendment, two constitutional bases
-the equal protection and the due process clauses of the four-
teenth amendment 4 0-afford protection to voting minors. Both
were invoked by the Michigan Supreme Court in a recent student
voting case, Wilkins v. Bentley,41 to invalidate a statute used to
deny registration to students.42 The Michigan court found that stu-
dents were denied due process, for one city official required that
elaborate questionnaires be filled out prior to allowing a student to
register, while in another city, a clerk asked no special questions of
students seeking registration. The court also stated that the stat-
ute, as it applied to students, violated the equal protection clause
because a burden was place on their right to vote. The court rea-
soned that ". . . the Equal Protection Clause likewise guards
against subtle restraints on the right to vote, as well as outright
denial."43  That the appellants in this case were all students over
twenty-one, is of little significance. The attempt to disqualify stu-
dents on grounds of residency is analogous to the situation in Joli-
coeur where registrars attempted the same thing with regard to
minors.
Since Jolicoeur recognizes, as does Wilkins, that the right to
meaningful franchise includes the right to vote where a person re-
sides, a sinilar argument may also be made for resting the Jolicoeur
decision within the equal protection clause. As Justice Douglas
noted in Harper v. Virginia,44 "Notions of what constitutes equal
treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change."' 4 5
With the extension of the franchise to minors eighteen to twenty,
40. ... No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CoNsT. amend
XIV, § 1.
41. - Micl -, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Wilkins].
42. 189 N.W.2d at 425. The statute in question provides that "no elector
shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his being
employed in the service of the United States or of this state, . . . nor
while a student at any institution of learning .... " 1MCLA, § 168.11(b).
The statute had been earlier defined by the court to mean that a student
must overcome a rebuttable presumption that he is not a resident in the
locale of the his institution of learning. Id.
43. 189 N.W.2d at 429.
44. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Harper].
45. 383 U.S. at 669.
it is not inappropriate that the flexible frontier of the equal pro-
tection clause should expand to protect this newly acquired voting
right when states seek to impede its exercise by imposing residen-
tial restrictions.
In Castro v. State of California,40 persons of Spanish ancestry
were denied registration pursuant to California Constitution, article
II, section 1, 4 7 which conditioned the right to vote on the ability to
read English. Because these persons could prove access to materials
in Spanish which sufficiently informed them of political events, this
provision was held to violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.48 The court in Jolicoeur, incorporating the
Castro decision, pointed out ". . . that all bona fide residents
substantially affected by the outcome of an election and capable of
voting intelligently and responsibly in it should be allowed to
vote. ' 49 Thus, the use of the equal protection clause is proper to
guarantee equal participation by all qualified to vote. Conse-
quently, whenever state action is taken to regulate suffrage, "...
it is not immune from the impact of the Equal Protection Clause."'10
In Louisiana v. United States,51 twenty-one parish registrars were
given unlimited discretion in administering an interpretation test
where an applicant was asked to interpret a section of the state or
federal Constitution. The result was that blacks were stymied in
their efforts to register while all white applicants were registered
under less rigorous procedures. Furthermore, it was not necessary
for those already registered, mostly whites, to reregister. The Court
reasoned that the test was not being applied alike to all potential
voters but was solely a restraint to bar registration by blacks. Find-
ing the test contrary to 42 U.S.C. 1971 (a) ,52 and also in violation of
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, the Court enjoined its fu-
ture use.
46. 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Castro].
47. [N]o person who shall not be able to read the Constitution in
the English language and write his or her name, shall ever exercise
the privilege of an elector in this State....
48. 2 Cal. 3d at 242, 466 P.2d at 258, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
49. 5 Cal. 3d at 576, 488 P.2d at 7, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
50. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 294.
51. 380 U.S. 145 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Louisiana].
52. All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by
law to vote at any election by the people in any State, Territory,
district, county, city, parish, township, school district, municipality,
or other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and allowed to
vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude; any constitution, law, custom, us-
age or regulation of any State or Territory, or by or under its au-
thority, to the contrary notwithstanding. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (a)
(1958).
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The decision in Louisiana is significant because the state regula-
tion was invalidated on more than one constitutional ground. It
suggests that the right to vote is to be afforded greater protection.
The Court has long recognized the right to vote as a fundamental
political right, because preservative of all other rights.53 There-
fore, the right to exercise the franchise, because it is basic to our
representative government, must necessarily be given additional
protection.
However, prior to invoking the equal protection clause to furnish
the added protection to the franchise, the pertinent question arising
is whether an absolute denial of the franchise by the state is neces-
sary. A showing of absolute denial before invoking the clause,
was found to be unnecessary in the Texas case of Carrington v.
Rash.54 There, a provision in the Texas Constitution provided
that a serviceman could only vote in the county he resided in at the
time he entered the service. The fact that he had since established
a permanent residence elsewhere meant nothing. The Court held
that this constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of
equal protection, there being no permissible basis for a distinction
between servicemen and other voters.5 5
Although the language of the opinion is in terms of an absolute
denial to servicemen of the right to vote, the soldier in Carrington
is not totally disenfranchised. The soldier may vote if he goes to
his residence at the time of entry into the military. Likewise, the
minor in Jolicoeur is not completely denied the right to vote, for he
may vote by going to his parents' residence. Both may vote by ab-
sentee ballots. Just as there is no permissible basis for distinguish-
ing between servicemen and other voters, there is no permissible
basis for distinguishing between minors and other qualified voters.
It is not surprising that the court in Jolicoeur held that "... Car-
rington obviously applies to minors as well as soldiers."
56
Likewise, the Michigan Supreme Court in Wilkins agree that ab-
solute denial of the franchise is unnecessary when they held that a
mere burden placed upon a student's right to vote is sufficient in-
fringement to invoke the fourteenth amendment.5 7 There, students
53. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
54. 380 U.S. 89 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Carrington].
55. 380 U.S. at 96.
56. 5 Cal. 3d at 572, 488 P.2d at 5, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 700-701.
57. 189 N.W.2d at 429.
were forced to overcome the rebuttable presumption that they were
not residents at their educational institution. This statute could
have effectively disenfranchised students where they lived and
planned to make their home indefinitely. The minors contesting in
Jolicoeur were not even afforded a rebuttable presumption to over-
come. Instead, their residence was conclusively presumed to be that
of their parents. Since the decision in Wilkins is in terms of bur-
dening the right to vote, once having established a burden on the
minor's right to vote, there is no need to search for evidence of total
disenfranchisement.5"
But the inquiry as to the applicability of the equal protection
clause does not end here. Pursuant to the established tenet that a
state may impose reasonable residency requirements for voting,
non-discriminatory classifications of voters are upheld where neces-
sary to promote a compelling state interest." However, in decid-
ing which classifications are sustainable, it has been suggested that
a classification which restricts a fundamental right asserted under
the equal protection clause "... must be closely scrutinized and
carefully confined."'60
In Harper the Court held that the right to vote was too precious
to be burdened by payment of a poll tax.61 The state justified the
tax by the fact that it was placed on all residents over twenty-one
years of age. Even though the restriction, applying to all alike, was
rational, it could not be sustained, for there existed no substantial
justification for it. The Court reasoned that there existed no rela-
tion between wealth and the ability to vote intelligently. Because
wealth was an irrelevant factor, the requirement of a poll tax
caused "invidious" discrimination and denied equal protection.
2
Similarly, the restriction in Jolicoeur cannot withstand present
scrutiny under the equal protection clause. It is highly unlikely
58. Another case couched in terms of burdening the right to vote rather
than complete denial is Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). There
Ohio election laws required that a new party seeking ballot position for a
presidential election had to obtain signatures of fifteen percent of the
electors voting in the last gubernatorial election. The Court said that this
law gave the two older parties a decided advantage over any new party.
When there are a number of parties attempting to secure ballot positions,
limiting the choice to two, unequally burdens the right to vote. The im-
position of such a burden on the voting right was held to be an invidious
discrimination which violated the equal protection clause. It cannot be
doubted that the right to vote is likewise heavily burdened when a minor
cannot register and vote where he resides.
59. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. at 91.
60. Harper v. Virginia, 383 U.S. at 670.
61. Id.
62. 383 U.S. at 668.
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that forcing minors to vote where their parents reside fosters intelli-
gent voting. To the contrary, having voters travel to their parents'
district undermines the principles of a representative government.
The substantial state justification for the restriction is completely
lacking.
Cases involving the classification of property and nonproperty
owners have followed the Harper precedent in determining the pres-
ence of a compelling state interest. In Kramer v. Union Free School
District,3 appellant, because he had no children and neither owned
nor leased property, was ineligible to vote in a school district elec-
tion. For the state, it was argued that the purpose of the classifica-
tion was to allow only those directly affected to vote.0 4 The Court,
in appplying the "close scrutiny" test of Harper, determined that
the classification did not accomplish the state's purpose with suffi-
cient precision to justify the restriction. 5 Precision was lacking,
for the limitation to property owners did not prevent those sub-
stantially interested from nevertheless being exluded. Though the
restriction was rational, this was not at issue, for the restriction
must further a compelling state interest to justify denial of the
franchise."0
Similarly, in Cipriano v. City of Houma,67 a restriction limiting
the franchise to property taxpayers in revenue bond elections, vio-
lated the equal protection clause. The state's justification for the
restriction was that the classification provided a "rational basis" for
limiting the franchise to voters having a "special interest".68 But
the Court held nonproperty owners to be substantially affected by
the issuance of revenue bonds to finance public utilities. The Court
reasoned that the issuance of a revenue bond is not connected with
the status of a property taxpayer. It noted that ". . . the benefits
and burdens of the bond issue fall indiscriminately on property
owner and nonproperty owner alike."69  The restriction did not
meet the "exacting standard of precision" announced in Kramer
because those affected by the election might nevertheless have been
63. 395 U.S. 621 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Kramer].
64. 395 U.S. at 631.
65. 395 U.S. at 632.
66. 395 U.S. at 633.
67. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
68. 395 U.S. at 706.
69. 395 U.S. at 705.
excluded.70 Therefore, their exclusion did not promote a compelling
state interest.
71
Minors, like nonproperty owners, students, and servicemen are
substantially affected and interested by the outcome of an election
where they reside:
The minor would thus be incapable of voting in the jurisdiction
where he permanently and legally resides, while the adult is free
not only to vote in such jurisdiction but to change the place where
he votes when he changes his residence. No basis for justifying
such an abridgment or discrimination on the right to vote, other
than the minor's age or distinctions dependent thereon, has been
suggested in the instant case.72
Previous classifications of nonproperty owners, students and
servicemen were abolished by the Court as repugnant to the equal
protection clause. It is not contrary to today's notions of equality
that Jolicoeur should rightly be among these cases. In Jolicoeur,
there existed a classification, which singled out a specific group,
minors, for differential treatment, which resulted in impairing a
fundamental right. Absent a countervailing, compelling state in-
terest to justify such treatment, there is reason to invoke the clause.
Equal Protection requires no less.
Vii. CONCLUSION
With the twenty-sixth amendment our political processes became
susceptible to revitalization by voting minors expressing themselves
at the polls of our nation. Yet, the possibility of this happening is
slim when the right to vote is so procedurally hampered that it
cannot be exercised freely. The decision in Jolicoeur sought to
maximize participation by voting minors by freeing them from fic-
tional residences. In so doing, it marks the initial step in transform-
ing a minor's newly acquired right to vote from a legal fiction to
an actual reality. The twenty-sixth amendment, as does due proc-
ess and equal protection, demands this result, for the unburdened
exercise of the franchise is a primary consideration in a democratic
society.
NIKKI Jo SANDERS
70. 395 U.S. at 706.
71. The Court went a step further in Phoenix v. Kolodzieski, 399 U.S.
204 (1970). Even though a tax burden would have been imposed upon
property owners if the issuance of the general obligation bonds were ap-
proved, the Court held nonproperty owners could not be excluded because
they are substantially affected by the ultimate outcome of the election.
72. 5 Cal. 3d at 583, 488 P.2d at 12, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
